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THE EFFECT OF AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS ON 
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL DISCLOSURE 
ABSTRACT 
This paper, using data from 100 UK listed firms, investigates the relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and intellectual capital (IC) disclosure. We find that IC disclosure is 
positively associated with audit committee characteristics of size and frequency of meetings, 
and negatively associated with audit committee directors’ shareholding. We find no significant 
relationship between IC disclosure and audit committee independence and financial expertise. 
We also observe variations in the association between audit committee characteristics and IC 
disclosure at its component level, which suggest that the underlying factors that drive various 
forms of IC disclosure, i.e. human capital, structural capital and relational capital, are different. 
These results have important implications for policy-makers who have a responsibility to 
ensure that shareholders are protected by prescribing appropriate corporate governance 
structures and accounting regulations/ guidelines. 
Key words: 
Corporate governance, audit committee characteristics, corporate reporting, intellectual capital 
disclosure 
1 Introduction 
It is generally agreed that audit committees play an important role in corporate governance, 
particularly in enhancing the board of directors’ effectiveness in monitoring management 
(Klein, 2002; Smith Report, 2003; Spira, 2003). In this respect, the literature has emphasised 
the enhancement of the financial reporting processes as the distinctive contribution that an 
effective audit committee can make (e.g. Forker, 1992; Smith Report, 2003; Mangena & Pike, 
2005), thus reducing information asymmetries between management and stakeholders 
(Mangena & Pike, 2005; Rainsbury, Bradbury, & Cahan, 2008). Previous studies have 
examined the effect of audit committee presence on financial reporting (Forker, 1992; Beasley, 
1996; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2001) and earnings management (Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 
2005). Other studies, mainly US-based, have examined the association between audit 
committee characteristics such as independence, shareholding, financial expertise and size (as 
measures of its effectiveness) and the firm’s quality of financial disclosures (e.g. Mangena & 
Pike, 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005), external auditor dismissal after issuing a 
going-concern report (Carcello & Neal, 2003), internet reporting (Kelton & Yang, 2008) and 
earnings management (e.g. Klein, 2002; Bédard, Chtourou, & Courteau, 2004).1 In general, the 
findings of these studies indicate that audit committees are important in the financial reporting 
processes. However, it is not clear whether the results of prior research, particularly those on 
financial disclosures, extend to intellectual capital (IC) disclosure practices. 
In a review of the state of financial and external reporting research, Parker (2007) 
identified IC accounting research as a major area for further research, particularly given that 
previous studies show that IC is critical in the value creation processes of the firm (e.g. 
Chaminade & Roberts, 2003; Habersam & Piber, 2003; Aboody & Lev, 2000) and the 
1
 With the exception of Mangena and Pike (2005), the few UK studies examining audit committees have focused on the presence/absence of 
the audit committee (e.g. Forker, 1992; Peasnell et al, 2005). However, given that the practice of establishing audit committees in UK firms 
is now prevalent (Spira, 2003; Mangena & Pike, 2005), it is now possible to investigate the impact of audit committee characteristics. We 
note that the results of US-based studies might not be applicable in the UK context given that the US corporate governance system is more 
prescriptive than the UK. Nevertheless, Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2003) and Peasnell et al. (2005) note that although the two corporate 
governance systems are different, the UK approach shares many of the key features of the US system. 
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increased demand for information about IC assets by the capital markets in firm valuation (Lev, 
2001; Holland, 2003; 2006 a, b). Therefore, the aim of this study is to investigate whether 
corporate governance mechanisms influence the firm’s IC disclosure practice. Specifically, the 
study examines the relationship between audit committee characteristics (size, frequency of 
meetings, independence, committee directors’ shareholding, and financial expertise)2 and IC 
disclosure by UK listed IC-intensive firms. Additionally, the study examines the relationship 
between the audit committee characteristics and the extent of IC disclosure in the individual IC 
components: human capital, structural capital and relational capital. It is possible that different 
audit committee characteristics may be related to different components of IC disclosure. 
We believe that the UK provides an appropriate environment to examine the issue because 
there are no stringent corporate governance and disclosure requirements, as existing for 
example in the US system (Peasnell et al., 2003). The ‘comply or explain’ approach to 
corporate governance adopted in the UK implies that there is a likelihood of greater variation in 
both corporate governance structures and disclosure which is important for a study of this 
nature. In addition, we use only IC-intensive firms because such firms are more likely to be 
heavily reliant on IC than non-IC-intensive sectors (Amir & Lev, 1996; Barth, Kasznik, & 
McNichols, 2001). Given that the literature argues that financial reporting model is largely not 
suited for IC-intensive sectors (Amir & Lev, 1996; Francis & Schipper, 1999), disclosure of IC 
information is more critical in these sectors and, therefore, it would be more interesting to 
investigate the role of corporate governance in IC disclosure practices of these sectors. 
IC is recognised in the literature as an integral part of a firm’s value-creating processes 
(e.g. Chaminade & Roberts, 2003; Habersam & Piber, 2003) and is the key to building 
competitive advantage and creating significant shareholder value (e.g. Bukh, 2003; Holland, 
2003). Indeed, firms make significant investments in IC related assets such as R&D, brand 
2
 These characteristics have been suggested in the literature (Smith Report, 2003) as important in enhancing the effectiveness of audit 
committee. 
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development, human development and advertising. However, because the existing GAAP 
allows IC investments to be expensed immediately or to be amortised arbitrarily, financial 
reports fail to reflect adequately such value-creating intangible assets (Lev & Zarowin, 1999). 
This deficiency in the reporting of IC-related information gives rise to increasing information 
asymmetry between firms and users of financial reports (Barth et al., 2001) and between 
informed and uninformed investors (Singh & Van der Zahn, 2008). This creates increased 
opportunities for moral hazard, adverse selection and other opportunistic behaviour by 
managers (Aboody & Lev, 2000). Consequently, this has evoked calls for external IC 
information communication from academics and regulators alike (e.g. FASB, 2001; Beattie, 
McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004) because IC disclosure helps reduce investor uncertainty about 
future prospects and facilitates a more precise valuation of the company (Bukh, 2003; Barth et 
al., 2001; Holland, 2003). In this context, it is reasonable to expect that the audit committee 
will play a critical role in enhancing IC disclosure to support investors’ valuation processes of 
the firm and supporting the monitoring role of the board of directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
A number of studies examine the extent of IC disclosure (Brennan, 2001; Beattie et al., 
2004; Beattie & Thomson, 2007; Li, Pike, & Haniffa, 2008; Striukova, Unerman, & Guthrie, 
2008). These studies generally show that although IC disclosure is still low, there has been an 
increase in IC disclosure over the years. There are also studies investigating the relation 
between IC disclosure and company-specific characteristics (such as firm size, industry) (e.g. 
Bozzolan, Favotto, & Ricceri, 2003; Striukova et al., 2008) and corporate governance (e.g. 
Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; White, Lee, & Tower, 2007; Li et al., 2008; Singh & Van der 
Zahn, 2008). The studies on the link between corporate governance and IC disclosure have 
mostly focused on board independence and ownership structure with limited systematic 
investigation being directed towards the role of the audit committee in IC disclosure.3 This is 
3
 Only Li et al. (2008) examine the effect of audit committee characteristics on IC disclosure, but focused only on two audit committee 
characteristics of size and frequency of meetings. 
3 
surprising because of the perceived critical role that the audit committee plays in overseeing 
the corporate reporting process (see Smith Report, 2003). The audit committee has specific 
responsibility, as delegated by the board, of monitoring the corporate reporting processes of the 
firm, including communicating with the external auditor (Carcello & Neal, 2003; Spira, 2003). 
It provides advice to CEOs on financial and non-financial information communication strategy 
(Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2009), and is involved in the assurance of social and environmental 
reporting (Jones & Solomon, 2010). 
The present study, therefore, makes some important contributions to the literature. First, it 
provides the first evidence on the relationship between audit committee characteristics and IC 
disclosure. At the overall IC disclosure level, the results show that IC disclosure is greater for 
firms with larger audit committees and audit committees that meet more frequently, but lower 
for firms whose audit committee members have large shareholdings. However, there is no 
significant relationship between IC disclosure and audit committee independence and financial 
expertise. These findings suggest that firms with audit committees that are larger, meeting 
more frequently, and whose members’ shareholding is lower are more likely to provide greater 
overall IC disclosure. Second, the study provides evidence on the relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and each of the three IC disclosure components: human capital, 
structural capital and relational capital. The results show that audit committee size is associated 
with all three IC disclosure components, whilst the frequency of audit committee meetings is 
related to structural and relational capital disclosure. Audit committee directors’ shareholding 
is only related to structural capital disclosure. These results appear to suggest that the 
underlying factors that drive various forms of IC disclosure, i.e. human, structural and 
relational, are different. 
On the whole, the findings show the importance of a well resourced audit committee (in 
terms of size and frequency of meetings) and an independent audit committee (in terms of 
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shareholdings) in corporate reporting, particularly the disclosure of IC information to the stock 
market. In line with the world-wide efforts to improve the effectiveness of audit committees in 
the financial reporting process (see Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; Smith Committee, 2003), 
our results are of interest to policy makers. The results are consistent with audit committee 
characteristics being associated with the disclosure of IC information, which is important for 
the valuation of shares by investors. Additionally, our results are of interest to investors and 
analysts as they provide a useful basis for assessing the information provided in annual reports. 
Finally, the results extend academic research attempting to enhance our understanding of the 
role of audit committees in the different aspects of corporate reporting. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
motivations for IC disclosure and the hypotheses development is outlined in Section 3. Section 
4 discusses the research methods used in the study. The empirical results are presented in 
Section 5 and, Section 6 concludes the study. 
2 Motivations for IC disclosure 
The importance of IC information to stock market participants’ investment decision-making 
processes is well documented in the literature. For example, Holland (2003; 2006a, b) find that 
analysts and fund managers demand and use IC information in their investment decisions and 
valuation of firms. Orens and Lybaert (2007) show that financial analysts who use more 
forward-looking and more internal-structure information (non-financial information), offer 
more accurate forecasts. García-Meca and Martínez (2007) find that analyst reports provide 
varying amounts of IC related information whilst Barth et al. (2001) observe that analyst 
coverage is significantly greater for firms with intensive R&D and advertising expenses 
relative to their industry. Other studies show that specific IC indicators, such as capitalisation 
of R&D costs (Aboody & Lev, 2000; Kimbrough, 2007), customer satisfaction (Ittner & 
Larcker, 1998), market penetration (e.g. Amir & Lev, 1996), and technological innovation 
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conditions (e.g. Matolcsy & Wyatt, 2008) have an impact on share prices and market values, 
suggesting that investors find them relevant for share valuation. 
In the context of the importance of IC, managers should have incentives to provide 
greater IC disclosure to support the stock market. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the 
separation of ownership and control in the modern firm creates information asymmetries 
between the managers and the outside investors. Consequently, this increases agency costs such 
as reduced liquidity of the company’s shares, management reputation, and higher cost of capital 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that increased disclosure reduces 
information asymmetry and therefore reducing the agency costs. Aboody and Lev (2000) argue 
that the information asymmetry between managers and investors is more acute for investments 
in IC than for investments in physical and financial assets because IC is unique to specific firms 
and cannot be inferred by looking at other firms. Additionally, unlike investments in physical 
and financial assets, IC reporting is largely unregulated. Francis and Schipper (1999) argue that 
the absence of regulation is compounded by the fact that accounting measurement and 
reporting rules mandate that most investments in IC are immediately expensed in the period in 
which they are incurred. Consequently, whilst investors are regularly informed about changes 
in physical and financial assets via mandated annual and interim reports, there is relatively 
scarce public information about IC investments. This creates a problem for investors when 
undertaking share valuation because they have little or no information about the productivity 
and value changes of IC investments. In this context, enhancing IC disclosures can be seen as an 
attempt by managers to reduce information asymmetry. This should reduce the uncertainty 
facing investors, thus increasing liquidity of the firm’s shares and reducing the cost of capital 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001; Botosan, 2006). Recent empirical studies (e.g. Kristandl & Bontis, 
2007; Mangena, Pike, & Li, 2010) provide evidence suggesting that firms engaging in greater 
IC disclosure have a lower cost of capital. Consistent with this, Beattie and Thomson (2010) 
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find, in a survey, that firms are motivated to report IC information by market-related incentives, 
in particular the opportunity to increase transparency and help reduce undervaluation of the 
firm’s share price. 
There are, however, potential costs of disclosure that may prevent managers from 
disclosing IC information, such as the danger of being unable to keep up with the standard set 
up and the reduced level of management flexibility (e.g. Habersam & Piber, 2003) and 
proprietary costs such as releasing valuable information to competitors. Beattie and Thomson 
(2010) find that managers considered releasing of information that might harm competitive 
position and setting disclosure precedence as key disincentives of voluntary IC disclosure. To 
the extent that the benefits of IC disclosure outweigh the costs, managers are more likely to 
have incentives to enhance disclosure. Nevertheless, managers may still have incentives to 
withhold IC information because lack of information hinders the ability of the capital and 
labour markets to monitor managers effectively (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). In this study we 
focus on the role of corporate governance, in particular the audit committee, in enhancing the 
extent of IC information disclosure. 
3. Hypotheses Development 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) and Li et al. (2008) suggest that corporate governance 
mechanisms are important in shaping IC disclosure strategies of the firm. They argue that given 
the role of corporate governance in resolving agency problems created by the separation of 
ownership and control, effective corporate governance structures, particularly board structures, 
would have a positive effect on the level of IC disclosure. The rationale for this argument is 
supported by Keenan and Aggestam (2001) who argue that the responsibility for prudent 
investment in IC resides with the board. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the board to 
develop new structures and processes for information communication about the value created 
for shareholders via the firm’s IC. Indeed, Holland (2006a) finds that boards of directors have 
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active roles in the disclosure processes related to the provision of information regarding the 
corporate value-creation process. Corporate reporting, including IC disclosure, is also 
emphasised in the UK Corporate Governance Code (UK Code, 2010) as a key responsibility of 
the board of directors. In this case, the UK Code (2010) recommends that the board has the 
responsibility to present a balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s financial 
performance, financial position and prospects. This assessment ‘should include in the annual 
report an explanation of the basis on which the company generates or preserves value over the 
longer term (the business model) and the strategy for delivering the objectives of the company’ 
(UK Code, 2010: 18). This implies that not only is the board responsible for reporting financial 
information, but also IC information and other non-financial information that helps investors 
understand how the firm creates and preserves value. This understanding is only possible when 
more information about IC is available to investors, particularly given the critical role IC plays 
in the value creating processes of firms (Holland, 2003). 
The extant literature suggests the board’s responsibility for corporate reporting is actuated 
through the audit committee (Smith Report, 2003; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Peasnell et al., 
2005). The role of the audit committee in monitoring reporting process has been widely 
discussed in the literature (e.g. Klein, 2002; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Rainsbury et al., 2008). 
Audit committees are viewed as a monitoring mechanism that reduces information 
asymmetries between a firm’s management and outside board members (Rainsbury, et al., 
2008). This improves the board’s role of monitoring management (Peasnell et al., 2005) and 
consequently the alignment of management’s interests with those of shareholders. The 
expectations about the role of audit committees in an increasingly complex global business 
environment have increased dramatically over the years (e.g. Smith Report, 2003). The UK 
Code (2010) recommends that audit committees should review the significant financial 
reporting issues and judgments made in connection with the preparation of the firm’s financial 
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statements, interim reports, preliminary announcements and related formal statements. This 
responsibility extends to such statements as the Operating and Financial Review (OFR), which 
is a highly IC related document. Consistent with this, recent evidence shows that the audit 
committee plays an important role in the assurance of social and environmental reporting 
(Jones & Solomon, 2010), which overlaps with IC disclosure (see e.g. Cordazzo, 2005). 
Beattie, Fearnley, and Hines (2008) report on the increasing focus on intangible asset issues by 
the audit committee chairman, thus stressing the increasing importance of IC and its related 
information at the board and audit committee levels. 
3.1 Audit Committee Characteristics 
It has been argued that the effectiveness of the audit committee is enhanced when the audit 
committee is well resourced, independent and has members with financial expertise (see Smith 
Report, 2003; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). In this section, we develop 
hypotheses regarding the effect of five audit committee characteristics (size, frequency of 
meetings, independence, audit committee directors’ shareholding, and financial expertise) on 
IC disclosure practices. 
3.1.1 Size of Audit Committee (SAC) 
In order to perform their role effectively, audit committees should have adequate resources and 
authority to discharge their increasing responsibilities (DeFond & Francis, 2005; Mangena & 
Pike, 2005; FRC, 2008). Bédard et al. (2004) argue that the larger the audit committee, the 
more likely it is to uncover and resolve potential problems in the financial reporting process, 
because it is likely to provide the necessary strength and diversity of views and expertise to 
ensure effective monitoring. This suggests that audit committee size is an integral factor for 
firms in delivering meaningful corporate reporting (Klein, 2002). However, it can also be 
argued that as the number of audit committee members increases, each may be comforted by 
the presence of others and free riders emerge (Klein, 2002; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). In 
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addition, larger audit committees are also likely to suffer from process losses and diffusion of 
responsibility (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). 
The Smith Report (2003) recommends a minimum of three non-executive directors. 
Empirically, the evidence is mixed. Some studies find audit committee size to be associated 
with lower earnings management (e.g. Yang & Krishnan, 2005; Cornett, McNutt, & Tehranian, 
2009), whilst others fail to find a significant relationship with financial reporting issues (e.g. 
Bédard et al., 2004) and voluntary disclosure in interim reports (Mangena & Pike, 2005). 
Given the mixed results, we do not predict a direction and hypothesise that: 
H1: There is a relationship between the level of IC disclosure and audit committee size, 
ceteris paribus. 
3.1.2 Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings (MAC) 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) argue that audit committees that meet more frequently means 
they have more time to perform the role of monitoring the corporate reporting process more 
efficiently. Yang and Krishnan (2005) opine that inactive audit committees are unlikely to 
monitor management effectively because it may be difficult for a small group of outsiders to 
detect fraud or accounting irregularities in a large, complex corporation in such a short time. In 
this case, adequate meeting time by the audit committee should be devoted to the consideration 
of major issues (e.g. Smith Report, 2003; Raghunandan & Rama, 2007) and this also sends a 
signal of the committee’s intention to remain informed and vigilant (McMullen & 
Raghunandan, 1996). For this reason, the FRC (2008: 6) states that ‘Sufficient time should be 
allowed to enable the audit committee to undertake as full a discussion as may be required’ and 
that ‘Formal meetings of the audit committee are the heart of its work’. The FRC (2008) 
recommends that audit committees should hold a minimum of three or four meetings a year. 
Prior studies find an impact of frequency of audit committee meetings on financial 
reporting issues such as earnings restatement (e.g. McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996), earnings 
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management (e.g. Cornett et al., 2009) and internet financial reporting (Kelton & Yang, 2008). 
We also expect that audit committees that meet more frequently have greater influence in 
overseeing IC disclosure practice, and therefore hypothesise that: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the level of IC disclosure and frequency of 
audit committee meetings, ceteris paribus. 
3.1.3 Audit Committee Independence (INED_AC) 
The notion that audit committee independence is important for its effectiveness draws from the 
widely accepted notion that independent directors are more likely to be effective monitors of 
management actions (e.g. Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to Carcello and Neal (2003) and 
Mangena and Pike (2005), independent audit committees are more likely to be free from 
management influence. Hence, they will ensure the quality and credibility of the reporting 
process, thus reducing information asymmetry. Since IC information plays an important role in 
the share valuation activities of the stock market (see Holland, 2003; Aboody & Lev, 2000), an 
independent audit committee would enhance the provision of such information for the benefit 
of the investors. The UK Code (2010) recommends that an audit committee should be 
comprised of at least three (or in the case of smaller companies, two) members, who should all 
be independent non-executive directors. 
On the empirical front, evidence is mixed. Some studies find the degree of audit committee 
independence to be positively associated with financial reporting quality (e.g. Mangena & 
Tauringana, 2007). Others find that firms with audit committees composed solely of outside 
directors are less likely to have financial reporting problems (e.g. McMullen & Raghunandan, 
1996). Yet others fail to find a significant effect of audit committee independence (e.g. Yang & 
Krishnan, 2005; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Bassett, Koh, & Tutticci, 2007). In spite of the 
mixed results, we expect a positive relationship between audit committee independence and IC 
disclosure. Our rationale for this is that unlike other disclosures that are regulated, IC reporting 
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is largely unregulated. This creates greater information asymmetry about IC information 
(Aboody & Lev, 2000; Holland, 2003) and opportunities for increased moral hazard, adverse 
selection and other opportunistic behaviour by managers (Aboody & Lev, 2000). To the extent 
that independent directors monitor managers effectively, we expect the independent audit 
committees to influence disclosure positively. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the level of IC disclosure and the 
independence of audit committees, ceteris paribus. 
3.1.4 Audit Committee Directors’ Shareholding (ADISH) 
The arguments on the effect of stock ownership by audit committee members are twofold. On 
the one hand, in line with agency theory, directors with high stock ownership should have 
interests that are more aligned with shareholders and may have stronger incentives to monitor 
the management (e.g. Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Sun, Cahan, & 
Emanuel, 2009). 4 On the other hand, excessive director shareholding could lead to 
entrenchment. In this case, high shareholdings by audit committee members may weaken their 
independence and oversight ability; cause them to act in their own interest at the expense of 
other shareholders; and hence affect their effectiveness (e.g. Mangena & Pike, 2005). 
Yang and Krishnan (2005) find a positive association between stock ownership by 
independent audit committee directors and quarterly earning management. Mangena and Pike 
(2005) report a significant negative relationship between disclosure in interim reports and audit 
committee directors’ shareholding. Cullinan, Du, and Wright (2008) find that companies with 
independent directors that do not receive stock options are less likely to misstate revenues. 
Other studies find a relation between audit committee directors’ shareholding and auditor 
dismissal (e.g. Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth, & Neal, 2009). These results suggest that 
higher share ownership by audit committee members is detrimental to its effective monitoring. 
4
 Sun et al. (2009) find that CEO stock option grants generate higher future operating income if directors who sit on the compensation 
committee hold more shares of that firm. Klein (2002) documents a negative association between earnings management and the proportion 
of blockholders on the audit committee. Others find that the greater the proportion of share ownership held by independent directors, the less 
likely firms will commit fraud (Beasley, 1996). 
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The recommendation by the UK Code (2010: 22) that ‘Remuneration for non-executive 
directors should not include share options or other performance-related elements. … Holding 
of share options could be relevant to the determination of a non-executive directors’ 
independence’ also suggests that greater share ownership may compromise the independence 
of the audit committee. We therefore hypothesise the following: 
H4: There is a negative relationship between the level of IC disclosure and the level of 
audit committee directors’ shareholding, ceteris paribus. 
3.1.5 Audit Committee Financial Expertise (FEXP_AC) 
The need for the audit committee to be composed of members with financial expertise was 
emphasised in the Smith Report (2003). Consequently, the UK Code (2010) has recommended 
that the audit committee should comprise members with knowledge of the business 
environment, and, at least one audit committee member should have recent and relevant 
financial experience. The rationale for this is that financial expertise will support the audit 
committee members to better understand auditor judgements and discern the substance of 
disagreements between management and external auditors (Mangena & Pike, 2005; 
Raghunandan & Rama, 2007). In addition, it will improve audit committee effectiveness in 
identifying and asking questions that ‘make management think harder and auditors dig deeper’ 
(Levitt, 2000). Knapp (1987) contends that if the audit committee does not possess the 
expertise to understand technical auditing and corporate reporting issues, its oversight role is 
likely to be discounted by the auditor and management. This would undermine the 
effectiveness of the audit committee in the financial reporting process. 
We argue that in the context of IC disclosure, the audit committee with financial expertise 
is likely to be in a better position to understand the capital market implications of providing 
quality IC disclosures, particularly in helping investors’ share valuation processes. Such 
understanding by the audit committee should lead to improvement in IC disclosure in order to 
communicate information on firms’ value creating processes. As Beattie and Thomson (2010) 
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document, the incentive for directors in disclosing IC information is to support the valuation 
activities of the stock market participants. Prior empirical studies indicate a negative relation 
between financial expertise and financial statements fraud (e.g. Abbott, Park, & Parker, 2000), 
earnings management (Klein, 2002), dismissal of auditors after issuing a going-concern report 
(Carcello & Neal, 2003), and a positive relationship with disclosure (e.g. Mangena & Pike, 
2005; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007). This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the level of IC disclosure and financial 
expertise on the audit committee, ceteris paribus. 
3.2 Control Variables 
To test the hypotheses, we control for a number of other variables. First, Klein (2002) argues 
that audit committee independence and effectiveness are embedded within the larger board, 
and it is important to control for overall board independence. As Beasley (1996) documents, 
the presence of the audit committee does not affect the likelihood of fraud, but the proportion of 
non-executive directors has a significant negative effect. Board independence is found to be 
negatively associated with earnings management (e.g. Klein, 2002; Cornett et al., 2009) and 
positively associated with corporate disclosures (e.g. Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Patelli & 
Prencipe, 2007). Previous studies examining IC disclosure (e.g. Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; 
White et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008) have found a positive relationship between board 
independence and IC disclosure. Thus, we predict a positive relationship. Second, the agency 
theory suggests that large outside blockholders have greater incentives to monitor managers 
(Agrawal & Chadha, 2005) and firms with closely-held ownership are expected to have less 
information asymmetry between management and dominant shareholders who have access to 
the information they need, especially IC information (Cormier, Magnan, & Van Velthoven, 
2005; Holland, 2006b). We therefore expect a negative relationship between IC disclosure and 
share ownership concentration. Third, we also control for firm size, which has consistently 
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been found to be associated with disclosure (see Mangena & Pike, 2005; Li et al., 2008). 
Fourth, listing age (period of listing) has also been found to be associated with disclosure (Li et 
al., 2008). The rationale for this is that the information asymmetry is likely to be higher for 
younger (or newly) listed firms (Singh & Van der Zahn, 2008) leading to higher agency costs 
(Jurkus, Park, & Woodard, 2011). Thus, our expectation is that younger listed firms will 
provide greater levels of IC disclosure to reduce the scepticism and boost confidence of 
investors who may perceive them as more risky (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Bozzolan et al., 
2003). Finally, profitability may be the result of continuous investment in IC and firms may 
engage in higher disclosure of such information to signal the quality of their decisions in 
investing for long-term growth in the value of the firm. We therefore expect a positive 
relationship between profitability and the level of IC disclosure. 
4 Research Design 
4.1 Sample Selection 
The sample of this study is limited to UK IC-intensive sector companies that are fully listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The sectors considered to be IC-intensive are 
pharmaceuticals & biotechnology, IT, media & publishing, business services providers, 
telecommunications, banking & insurance, and food production & beverage (see also Guthrie, 
Petty, & Riccerri, 2007; Striukova et al., 2008; Mangena et al., 2010). The choice of these 
sectors derives from the fact that the existing financial reporting model is not suited for 
IC-intensive sectors (Amir & Lev, 1996; Francis & Schipper, 1999) and therefore, the role of 
IC information in the valuation processes of stock market participants is particularly critical for 
companies in these sectors. Consequently, we expect the role of the audit committee in 
enhancing IC disclosure to be much more important in these firms in order to address the 
critical information asymmetries caused by the weaknesses in the financial reporting model. 
The population size for the seven IC-intensive sectors on the LSE was 319 companies, from 
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which a sample of 100 was selected.5 The sample was considered appropriate for the regression 
model which contains 10 independent variables (see Section 4.3). Stevens (1996) suggests that 
for each independent variable, there must be a minimum of 10 observations. 
To select the sample, we apply proportionate stratified sampling (Moser & Kalton, 1996) 
to ensure that we build a sample that is representative of the sectors selected and the size of the 
firms.6 We considered that as the number of firms in each industry group is not the same (see 
Table 1, column A), simple random sampling will not be able to ensure this objective. The 
number of companies required from each of the seven sectors was computed and is shown in 
Table 1, column C. 
[Table 1 insert here] 
To ensure that our sample includes both large and small firms, we first ranked companies 
in each sector by market capitalisation. We then systematically select one firm from every three 
firms in each industry grouping. 
4.2 IC Disclosure Measures 
The IC disclosure measures were developed from the annual reports published in the financial 
year-ends ranging from March 2004 to February 2005. The choice for this period was driven by 
the desire to eliminate the possible disclosure effects of the OFR requirements, which were to 
become effective early 2005.7 We took the view that using annual reports published prior to, 
In determining the sample of 100 firms, we apply the formula suggested in Moser and Kalton (1996), i.e. n = π (1-π)/[S.E. (p)]2, where n = 
required sample size; π = proportion of the particular attribute in the population (estimated at 50/50); and S.E. (p) = the standard error that is 
allowed for the study (set at 5%). If the variability in the population (proportion with particular attribute in the population) is estimated at 
50%, a value that is always assumed to be the maximum variance, with standard error of 5%, the sample size is 100. The sample size was 
considered appropriate for the number of variables included in the regression model. 
Based on stratified sampling, the population is divided into two or more relevant and significant strata based on one or a number of attributes 
(Moser & Kalton, 1996). A sample is then selected from each stratum separately, producing s stratified sample. The two main reasons for 
The statutory requirement for quoted companies to publish an OFR for financial years beginning on or after 1 April 2005 was repealed in 
January 2006. Requirements of OFR cover some of the issues relevant to IC, particularly human and relational capital. Although OFR 
requirements were repealed, companies are now required to include Business Review in the Director’s Report, which is a reduced version of 
OFR. It requires quoted companies to include information about ‘environmental matters, the company’s employees, and social and 
community issues’ (Companies Act, 2006, 417, 5b) and analysis using financial and other key performance indicators (KPI) (Companies Act, 
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instead of after the mandatory OFR, allows a clearer determination of voluntary IC disclosure 
and would result in greater variations in the IC disclosure measure. Variation is necessary in 
regressions examining disclosure (Gietzmann & Ireland, 2005). We do not believe the use of 
this data would in any way effect the significance of the subsequent findings, because our focus 
is to investigate the effect of audit committee characteristics on IC reporting instead of how 
much IC information is disclosed in the annual reports. 
Although there are various other communication channels, such as the corporate website 
and analyst presentations, the use of the annual report to measure corporate disclosure is widely 
adopted and well justified in the literature. For example, annual reports are regularly and 
consistently produced and widely distributed by listed firms, given their mandatory nature 
(Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995) and are the main channel by which firms communicate with 
investors and other stakeholders (Bozzolan et al., 2003). Moreover, the majority of previous 
studies have taken the view that the annual report offers a relevant and useful proxy for the 
level of corporate disclosure provided by a firm along all disclosure avenues (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993). 
To measure IC disclosure, we employ content analysis, a method that has been applied by 
prior studies in measuring IC disclosure (Beattie & Thomson, 2007; Li et al., 2008). We apply 
the 61-item IC disclosure checklist developed by Li et al. (2008), which was also for a sample 
of UK companies. All the items in the checklist were voluntary for the period covered by this 
study. Compared to other studies (Brennan, 2001; Guthrie et al., 2007), Li et al. (2008) 
provides the most comprehensive checklist divided into human, structural and relational items 
(see Appendix A). The scoring of the IC research instruments was performed manually 
covering the whole annual report. Our scoring approach is such that each IC item is scored 
based on three presentational formats (i.e. text, numerical and graphical/pictorial), and receives 
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a maximum of three points.8 This means that a firm can score a maximum of 183 points (i.e. 61 
IC items x 3 formats). All items are equally weighted because weighting does not influence the 
results of regression analysis (see Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Mangena & Pike, 2005). After 
scoring all the 61 IC items in the three presentational formats, the IC disclosure score(s) for 
each company are computed as an index by dividing the sum of items disclosed (adding all the 
1s) by the total number of items expected (total count of all the 1s and 0s) (see also Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002). For each company, we created four disclosure indices to capture the overall IC 
(ICDI), human capital (HIC), structural capital (SIC) and relational capital (RIC) disclosure. 
The scoring process was mainly completed by one researcher interacting with the 
document. This raises questions about reliability of the scores in that they may only reflect that 
person’s conception of reality (Gray et al., 1995), rather than any potential objective reality that 
exists in relation to IC disclosure (Beattie & Thomson, 2007). Therefore, eight annual reports 
were randomly selected and recoded by another two independent coders. Krippendorff s (1980) 
alpha was computed to test for reliability because it can account for chance agreement among 
multiple coders. The independent scores (not tabulated) are all above the minimum 80% 
threshold considered reliable for content analysis (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005). 
4.3 Models 
Multiple regression analysis is used to test the relationship between IC disclosure and the audit 
committee characteristics and control variables. We run the following regression model 
separately for the overall IC disclosure (ICDI), human capital disclosure (HICDI), structural 
capital disclosure (SICDI) and relational capital disclosure (RICDI) indices. 
IC Disclosure = β0 + β1 SAC + β2 MACi + β3 INED_AC + β4 LnADISH + β5 FEXPAC + 
β
 6 INED + β7 SqSCON + β8 LnAGE + β9 ROA + β10 LnSA + ε i 
The approach we adopt in scoring is essentially dichotomous in that an item (i.e. each of the three presentational formats of an IC item) scores 
1 if disclosed and 0 if it is not. 
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All variables are as defined in Table 2. 
[Table 2 insert here] 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table 3, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of IC disclosure indices, at the overall, 
component and industry sector level.9 Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Brennan, 2001; 
Bozzolan et al., 2003; Striukova et al., 2008) the level of IC disclosure is low. The mean index 
for overall IC disclosure is 0.36 (ranging from 0.16 to 0.56) (i.e. 36% of 183 format items were 
disclosed). As for the components of IC, firms appear to provide slightly greater structural 
capital information at 37.1% than both relational capital and human capital disclosures at 
36.5% and 35.5%, respectively. At the industry sector level, we observe that the banking and 
insurance sector provides the highest level of IC disclosure whilst the IT sector provides the 
lowest. However, the Kruskal-Wallis test shows no significant difference in IC disclosure 
scores among the seven sectors indicating that for our sample of firms, the industry sector does 
not influence the level of IC disclosure.10 
[Table 3 insert here] 
In Panel B, the summary descriptive statistics for the independent variables are presented. 
Focusing on the audit committee, the mean of audit committee size is approximately three 
members, consistent with the recommendations of the UK Code (2010). We observe that audit 
committees meet, on the average, about four times per year. The average proportion of 
independent audit committees is 85%, suggesting that audit committees in the majority of firms 
are comprised of members who are independent. In terms of share ownership, the mean audit 
For industry, we only provide the descriptive statistics for the overall IC disclosure for easy and clear presentational purposes. 
Later in our regression analysis, we also include the industry dummy variables in the model, and find that none of the industries are 
significant. Our main results are not significantly affected. 
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committee shareholding is 1.6%, ranging from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 51.4%.11 
On the whole, we observe that 59% of the sample firms have audit committees comprised 
solely by independent non-executive directors. 
In terms of the control variables, the statistics show that the mean for the significant 
shareholding is 29.6% and board independence is 47.5% suggesting non-compliance with the 
recommendation of the UK code (2010) for at least half of the board to be independent 
non-executive directors.12 The mean size of the firm is £4,036.7 million and the average listing 
age is 17 years, whilst the average profitability is 4.4%. 
5.2 Multiple Regression Results 
Prior to running the multiple regression analysis, we first examine our data to detect violations 
of normality and also examine whether multicollinearity was a problem among independent 
variables. We find that, whilst all the dependent variables are normally distributed, based on 
both standard tests on skewness and kurtosis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Lilliefors test,13 
some of the independent variables (i.e. audit committee directors’ shareholding, share 
ownership concentration, listing age and firm size) are not. These were transformed using the 
natural log and square root transformations. 14 For multicollinearity, we examine the 
correlations among the independent variables. In Table 4, we present the correlation and partial 
correlation (controlling for firm size) matrices between the dependent and independent 
variables. It can be seen from Panel A of Table 4 that independent variable associations are all 
below 0.70.15 Table 4 Panel B reveals no multicollinearity among independent variables after 
controlling for firm size, with all independent variable associations below 0.35. We also 
11
 There are six firms in which the chairman of the board, who also sits on the audit committee, has a significant amount of shareholding. An 
extreme case is where the chairman held 45.8% of the firm’s shares. In these firms, the audit committee shareholding ranges between 3% 
and 51.4%. These firms appear to be smaller firms. If we exclude these firms, the mean audit committee shareholding is about 0.3%. 
12
 However, smaller firms can have at least two independent non-executive directors. 
13
 K-S Lilliefors with significance of >0.05 indicate normality (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). 
14
 Audit committee directors’ shareholding, listing age and firm size are transformed using natural log transformation (i.e. LnADISH, LnAGE, 
LnSA), whereas square root transformation is more effective for share concentration (SqSCON). The transformed variables all indicate 
normality of distribution (not tabulated). 
15
 The ‘rule of thumb’ for checking problems of multicollinearity using a correlation matrix is when the correlation is >0.80 (Belsley et al., 
1980). The correlation coefficient of -0.663 between LnSA and LnADISH is the highest amongst all, which is still within the threshold. 
Audit committee directors’ shareholding is considered to be an important characteristic that could affect the effective functioning of the 
committee, and hence is included in the analysis. 
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examine the variation inflation factors (VIF) and find that they are all less than 3 (see Table 5), 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem.16 
[Table 4 insert here] 
In Table 5, the regression results of the relationship between the audit committee characteristics 
and IC disclosure are presented (Models 1-4). Model 1 presents the results of the overall IC 
disclosure (ICDI) model, whilst Models 2, 3 and 4 present the results for the individual 
components of IC disclosure, that is, human capital (HICDI), structural capital (SICDI) and 
relational capital (RICDI) disclosure, respectively. All the models have significant explanatory 
power. The adjusted R2s range from a lower of 40.8% for human capital disclosure to the 
highest of 63.1% for the overall IC disclosure. 
[Table 5 insert here] 
In respect to our main variables, the results show that audit committee size (SAC) is 
significantly and positively associated with the overall IC disclosure and all three IC disclosure 
components at the 5% level. Thus our hypothesis H1 is supported. This is consistent with 
findings from Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Cornett et al. (2009) on earnings management, 
but contradict Bédard et al. (2004) and Mangena and Pike (2005) on financial reporting quality. 
Nonetheless, these findings support the argument that when audit committees are well 
resourced, their effectiveness is enhanced (DeFond & Francis, 2005; FRC, 2008). In this case, 
we argue that larger audit committee means the ability to effectively oversee the information 
provided in documents such as the OFR (Smith Report, 2003), which typically has a strong IC 
disclosure emphasis, is improved. 
The frequency of audit committee meetings (MAC) is positively associated with overall 
IC disclosure and structural capital and relational capital disclosure at the 5% level, thus 
supporting hypothesis H2. The frequency of audit committee meetings has also been found to 
16
 Previous authors suggest multicollinearity becomes a serious problem where VIFs exceed 10 (Belsley et al., 1980). Further, the condition 
indexes, using eigenvalues of the independent variables correlation matrix, were also acceptable with all being below 30. 
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be associated with more management earnings forecasts (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005), less 
earnings management (Cornett et al., 2009) and earnings restatement (McMullen & 
Raghunandan, 1996). The results imply that audit committee activity is an important factor in 
enhancing IC disclosure in order to reduce information asymmetry. These results are consistent 
with corporate governance recommendations (e.g. UK Code, 2010) that the audit committee 
should meet more frequently. More frequent meeting would mean high-level oversight of all 
corporate reporting issues, including IC disclosure. However, we do not find a significant 
relationship between human capital disclosure and frequency of audit committee meetings. 
This is puzzling, but it is possible that structural and relational capital related issues require 
more time for discussion than human capital related issues. 
We observe that audit committee independence (INED_AC) is not significantly associated 
with any of the IC disclosure indices. These results are inconsistent with our prior expectations 
in hypothesis H3 and contradict other previous studies (e.g. Mangena and Tauringana, 2007), 
showing a positive relationship between audit committee independence and corporate 
compliance with non-mandatory best practice statements. However, the results support the 
findings of Yang and Krishnan (2005), Agrawal and Chadha (2005), and Bassett et al. (2007), 
who also fail to detect a significant relationship. These findings suggest that audit committee 
independence does not affect IC disclosure. We observe that although not significant, the 
direction of the relationship is negative for overall IC disclosure, structural and relational 
capital disclosure, but positive for human capital disclosure. One possible explanation is that 
independent audit committees may be more mindful of avoiding releasing proprietary 
information to competitors.17 
The results for audit committee directors’ shareholding (LnADISH) are negative and 
17
 For example, information relating to structural capital (such as intellectual property, research and development) and relational capital (such 
as customers, distribution channels, favourite contracts) may be used by competitors. However, for human capital, independent audit 
committee members may encourage disclosure as a public relation tool in order to attract quality employees as well as retaining existing 
employees. 
22 
significant at the 5% level, but only for the overall IC disclosure and structural capital 
disclosure, thus hypothesis H4 is supported for these two indices.18 The relationship between 
human and relational capital disclosure indices and audit committee shareholding is not 
significant. The negative results, for overall IC disclosure and structural capital disclosure, are 
consistent with previous studies (e.g. Mangena & Pike, 2005; Yang & Krishnan, 2005) and 
suggest that greater IC disclosure is less likely when audit committee members hold greater 
shareholding. This means that share ownership compromises the audit committee’s 
independence and therefore their motivation to effectively monitor the reporting processes. 
The implication of this is that greater share ownership by audit committee directors is 
undesirable, thus supporting the UK Code (2010) recommendation that remuneration for 
non-executive directors should not include share options or other performance-related 
elements. We suggest that in measuring the independence of the audit committee, it is 
important to consider the level of shareholding of the audit committee members than merely 
considering the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee. 
Finally, the relationship between audit committee financial expertise (FEXP_AC) and IC 
disclosure is negative and significant at the 10% level, but only for structural capital disclosure. 
Hence, hypothesis H4 is not supported. These results are surprising and do not support 
previous studies showing a negative relationship with earnings management (Klein, 2002) and 
dismissal of auditors after issuing a going-concern report (Carcello & Neal, 2003), and a 
positive relationship with disclosure (e.g. Mangena & Pike, 2005; Mangena & Tauringana, 
2007). The findings also do not support the Smith Report (2003) and UK Code’s (2010) 
recommendations that the audit committee should have members with financial expertise. It is 
possible that financial expertise is relevant for financial related issues than for IC reporting 
issues. 
18
 We re-run the regression with a reduced number of firms by excluding six firms in which the audit committee share ownership is too high., 
i.e. firms with individual audit committee members holding 3% of ordinary shares. The results are maintained. 
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In terms of the control variables, we find that board independence (INED) is positively 
associated with structural capital disclosure at the 5% level, and only at the 10% level with 
overall IC and relational capital disclosure. No significant relationship is detected for human 
capital disclosure. The positive association is generally consistent with the previous findings 
on IC disclosures (e.g. Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; White et al., 2007), suggesting the 
presence of independent non-executive directors on the board improves the monitoring of 
management actions. Share ownership concentration (SqSCON) shows a significant negative 
association with overall IC disclosure and structural capital disclosure at the 5% level, but no 
significant relationship with relational and human capital disclosure. The negative coefficients 
suggest that enhanced IC disclosure is less likely in firms with higher share ownership 
concentration. The results are consistent with prior studies (e.g. Cormier et al., 2005; Patelli & 
Prencipe, 2007). A possible reason is that large shareholders obtain the information in private 
meetings (see Holland, 2003) and therefore would not demand firms to enhance public 
disclosure of the information. We also find that listing age (LnAGE) is negatively and 
significantly associated with overall IC disclosure, human capital disclosure and relational 
capital disclosure at the 5% level. This provides evidence for signalling theory in that younger 
listed firms are more inclined to provide IC disclosure to help reduce uncertainty and lower the 
cost of capital (see Singh & Van der Zahn, 2008). Profitability (ROA) shows a significant 
positive association with overall IC disclosure and relational capital disclosure at the 5% level 
and with structural capital disclosure at the 10% level. The finding adds to the literature on 
profitability effect on IC disclosure (e.g. García-Meca & Martínez, 2005; Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti, 2007). Finally, as would be expected, firm size (LnSA) shows a significant positive 
relationship with all IC disclosure indices, except structural capital, at the 1% level. 
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Taken overall, our results suggest that audit committee characteristics of size, frequency of 
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meetings and committee directors’ shareholding are related to IC disclosure, but audit 
committee independence and financial expertise are not significantly related to IC disclosure. 
We conduct additional analyses to check the robustness of our results. However, we run these 
robustness tests on overall IC disclosure only. The results of the additional analyses are 
presented in Table 6. 
[Table 6 insert here] 
In Model 5, we conduct the analysis by introducing an alternative measure of audit 
committee independence, measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the committee 
is comprised solely of independent non-executive directors and 0 otherwise (INED_AC_Dum) 
(e.g. Bédard et al., 2004). DeFond and Francis (2005) argue that the extant literature does not 
address whether 100% independent audit committees improve governance beyond simply 
having a high proportion of independent members, while Bronson et al. (2009) argue that the 
benefits of audit committee independence are consistently achieved only when the audit 
committees are completely independent. Using the alternative dummy measure does not alter 
our results.19 In Model 6, we introduce an additional variable, company chairman on audit 
committee (CHAC), in the regression analysis. The Smith Report (2003: para. 3.2) 
recommends that ‘the chairman of the company should not be an audit committee member’.20 
We expect that the presence of the company chairman on an audit committee dilutes its 
independence and effectiveness. We measure CHAC as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 
if chairman of the board sits on the audit committee and 0 otherwise. The introduction of 
CHAC does not alter the original results and CHAC shows no significant association with IC 
disclosure. We also include board size (BSZ) in the model (see Model 7). Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti (2007) find board size to be negatively associated with IC disclosures. We do not 
19
 We also split the sample by the mean score of audit committee independence (i.e. 0.848). A firm scores 1 if 84.8% or more of their audit 
committee members are independent and 0 otherwise. The regression results for this measure are the same to that of INED_AC_Dum. 
20
 This recommendation was later amended in the Combined Code (2008) to allow chairmen of smaller listed firms to be members of the audit 
committee if they were considered independent on appointment. 
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find a significant relationship between board size and IC disclosure and our original results are 
also not affected by the introduction of board size in the regression model. Finally, we 
introduce both BSZ and CHAC in one model (see Model 8) and our results remain largely the 
same. These additional analyses suggest that our results are robust to alternative measures and 
to the inclusion of additional variables. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
The audit committee is a sub-committee of the board with the key responsibility for monitoring 
the corporate reporting processes in order to support the overall board’s monitoring role of 
management actions. In this respect, the audit committee’s role is not only about the financial 
reporting process, but it extends to the reporting of non-financial information including IC 
information. To the extent that IC information is important for the valuation of the firm’s 
shares, we argue that the audit committee would influence its disclosure to the stock market to 
reduce the acute information asymmetry associated with the value creation capabilities of IC 
assets. Consequently, in this paper we examine the role of the audit committee in enhancing the 
disclosure of IC information in the annual reports of UK listed IC-intensive firms. Specifically, 
we investigate the relationship between audit committee characteristics and IC disclosure. We 
find audit committee size and frequency of audit committee meetings to be positively related to 
IC disclosure. We also find that audit committee directors’ shareholding is negatively related to 
the level of IC disclosure. Except for audit committee size, the results are mixed for the 
components of IC disclosure: human capital, structural capital and relational capital disclosure. 
Surprisingly, we find no significant relationship between IC disclosure and audit committee 
independence and financial expertise. However, on the whole the results are consistent with the 
notion that the role of audit committees in monitoring the corporate reporting processes 
extends to non-financial information such as IC disclosure. Additionally, the effectiveness of 
the audit committee is dependent on its resources in terms of size and frequency of meetings 
and the level of committee members’ share ownership. Higher share ownership by audit 
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committee members could be detrimental to the monitoring of the corporate reporting 
processes by the audit committee. 
Our study makes important contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the 
limited UK evidence on factors that affect IC disclosure, and in particular we offer the first 
evidence in the UK on a systematic review of the effect of audit committee characteristics on 
IC disclosure. Second, we offer evidence on the effect of audit committee characteristics on IC 
disclosure at the IC component level. The findings of our study have important implications for 
policy-makers who have a responsibility to ensure that shareholders are protected by 
prescribing appropriate corporate governance structures and accounting regulations/ 
guidelines. They confirm the recommendations of the codes of corporate governance in 
different countries that audit committees have a critical role in monitoring corporate reporting 
and therefore reducing information asymmetries. In addition, they confirm the importance of 
providing adequate resources to the audit committee and to ensure its independence in 
executing its key responsibility of overseeing the corporate reporting processes. 
The findings must be interpreted in the context of a number of limitations. First of all, the 
study measures IC disclosure in annual reports, yet there are other media in which information 
is disclosed. It would be interesting to consider different media such as the website, analyst 
presentations, etc. to provide wide coverage of IC information. Second, the study examines a 
limited number of factors, and there may be other factors that affect IC disclosure practices that 
have not been examined in this study. For example, the engagement between the audit 
committee and external auditors can be an important factor that affects disclosure. Future 
studies could usefully explore this avenue. Third, the study suffers from the usual limitations of 
similar studies in that they do not address issues relating to the processes by which the board or 
audit committee influences disclosure decisions. Future studies could interview board 
members to understand how they influence corporate reporting practices. Finally, the study 
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focuses on industry sectors considered to be IC-intensive only, which does not reflect the 
practice of all LSE-listed UK firms. 
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Table 1 Number of Samples by Industry Sector 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Industry Category 
Biotechnology & Pharmaceutical (BPH) 
Information Technology (IT) 
Media & Publishing (M&P) 
Business Services Providers (BSP) 
Telecommunication Services (Telecom) 
Banks & Insurance (B&I) 
Food Production & Beverage (F&Bev) 
Total 
Population 
of Firms 
40 
60 
45 
83 
18 
51 
22 
319 
% of total 
population 
12.5% 
18.8% 
14.1% 
26.0% 
5.6% 
16.0% 
6.9% 
100% 
Sample 
13 
19 
14 
26 
6 
15 
7 
100 
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Table 2 Dependent and Independent Variables, Measurement and Source of Information 
Panel A Depende 
IC disclosure 
index 
Variable 
nt Variables 
IC Disclosure in three 
presentational formats 
Operationalisation 
The 61 IC items in the research instrument are scored in three presentational 
formats, i.e. text, numerical and graphical/pictorial, producing a total of 183 format 
items. The overall IC disclosure index (ICDI) is computed as the number of format 
items disclosed in the annual report divided by 183. The overall disclosure index is 
split into its three components: human capital disclosure (HICDI), structural capital 
disclosure (SICDI) and relational capital disclosure (RICDI). 
Source 
Annual 
report 
(AR) 
Acronym 
ICDI 
HICDI 
SICDI 
RICDI 
Panel B Independent Variables 
Audit 
committee 
characteristics 
Control 
variables 
Size of audit committee 
Frequency of audit 
committee meetings 
Audit committee 
independence 
Audit committee 
directors’ shareholding 
Audit committee 
financial expertise 
Share ownership 
concentration 
Board independence 
Listing age (length of 
listing on LSE) 
Profitability 
Firm size (sales) 
Number of board directors on the audit committee as at the financial year end. 
Number of audit committee meetings held during the financial year of study. 
Number of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee (specified 
in the annual report) divided by the total number of directors on the audit 
committee at the end of the financial year. (%) 
Percentage cumulative shareholdings by audit committee directors to total number 
of outstanding ordinary shares at the financial year end. (%) 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if one or more audit committee members have 
financial expertise and 0 otherwise. 
Percentage cumulative shareholdings by individuals or organizations classified as 
substantial shareholders (i.e. owning 3% or more of the firm’s share capital), 
excluding significant directors’ shareholdings, to the total number of outstanding 
ordinary shares at the financial year end. (%) 
Number of independent non-executive directors on board (specified in the annual 
reports) divided by total number of directors on board at the financial year end. (%) 
Number of days listed scaled by 365 days a year. 
Return/ total assets for the financial year of study. 
Sales revenue of the financial year of study. 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
LSE 
website 
AR 
AR 
SAC 
MAC 
INED AC 
ADISH 
FEXP AC 
SCON 
INED 
AGE 
ROA 
SA 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Mean Median Min Max SD 
Panel A - Dependent variables 
Overall IC Disclosure (ICDI) 
Human Capital Disclosure (HICDI) 
Structural Capital Disclosure (SICDI) 
Relational Capital Disclosure (RICDI) 
Overall IC 
Disclosure (ICDI) 
by industry sectors21 
BPH 
IT 
M&P 
BSP 
Telecom 
B&I 
F&Bev 
0.36 
0.355 
0.371 
0.365 
0.351 
0.334 
0.372 
0.344 
0.389 
0.410 
0.368 
0.36 
0.348 
0.370 
0.349 
0.310 
0.330 
0.390 
0.353 
0.399 
0.437 
0.410 
0.16 
0.212 
0.130 
0.111 
0.250 
0.160 
0.210 
0.220 
0.246 
0.273 
0.257 
0.56 
0.561 
0.574 
0.667 
0.480 
0.430 
0.550 
0.530 
0.508 
0.563 
0.454 
0.08 
0.073 
0.092 
0.122 
0.076 
0.064 
0.085 
0.085 
0.096 
0.089 
0.078 
Panel B - Independent variables 
Audit committee characteristics 
Size of audit committee (number) (SAC) 
Frequency of audit committee meetings (number) (MAC) 
Audit committee independence (INED_AC) (%) 
Audit committee directors’ shareholding (%) (ADISH) 
3.46 
3.70 
0.848 
0.016 
3 
4 
1 
0.00033 
J 22 
1 
0 
0.00 
7 
9 
1 
0.514 
1.058 
1.411 
0.219 
0.068 
Other corporate governance factors 
Share ownership concentration (%) (SCON) 
Board independence (%) (INED) 
0.296 
0.475 
0.261 
0.500 
0 
0.180 
0.792 
0.750 
0.196 
0.125 
Firm-specific factors 
Listing age (Years) (AGE) 
Profitability (%) (ROA) 
Firm size (£m) (Sales - SA) 
17.150 
0.044 
4036.7 
10.693 
0.037 
383.1 
0.449 
-0.095 
0.0023 
71.874 
0.187 
39792.2 
16.706 
0.058 
8782.4 
Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted. The Chi-square result is 8.63 (p=0.195) suggesting there are no significance differences in IC disclosure among the seven 
industrial sectors. 
One company was recorded to have one member in the audit committee. The company had three members in the audit committee at the beginning of the 
financial year studied. However, only one member served the full financial year. The member is not an internal auditor, as the company did not have an internal 
audit function at the time. 
The company is an active trading company focusing on R&D. Although there were no sales recorded during 2004 financial year, contracts were signed. The 
company had a market capitalisation of £46 million in November 2004. Further analysis was conducted by excluding the company; the results (not tabulated) 
are consistent with those reported in the report. 
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Table 4 Correlation and Partial Correlation (Controlling for Firm Size) Matrices: Dependent and Non-categorical Independent Variables 
ICDI 
Panel A – Correlations 
SAC 
MAC 
INEDAC 
LnADISH 
INED 
SqSCON 
LnAGE 
ROA 
LnSA 
.511*** 
.498*** 
.216** 
-.604*** 
.340*** 
.442*** 
.119 
.205*** 
704*** 
Panel B - Partial Correlati 
SAC 
MAC 
INEDAC 
LnADISH 
INED 
SqSCON 
LnAGE 
ROA 
.273*** 
.228** 
.049 
-.258*** 
.281*** 
-.248** 
-.122 
.208** 
HICDI 
477*** 
.336*** 
.186* 
-.404*** 
.154 
-.297*** 
.034 
.049 
.621*** 
ons (Contro 
.256** 
.028 
.034 
.013 
.034 
-.068 
-.192* 
-.003 
SICDI 
.408*** 
.445*** 
.231** 
-.544*** 
.367*** 
-.437*** 
.195* 
.191* 
.568*** 
l Variable -
.185* 
.220** 
.106 
-.272*** 
.310*** 
-.279*** 
.040 
.176* 
RICDI 
.480*** 
474*** 
.182* 
-.541*** 
.313*** 
-.383*** 
.089 
.209** 
.642*** 
LnSA) 
.251** 
.222** 
.022 
-.201** 
.241** 
-.181* 
-.130 
.205** 
SAC 
1 
.283*** 
.208** 
-.305*** 
.234** 
-.167* 
.265*** 
.089 
.485*** 
1 
.047 
.098 
.025 
.157 
.033 
.150 
.056 
MAC 
1 
.223** 
-.437*** 
.185* 
-.179* 
.137 
.071 
.510*** 
1 
.109 
-.154 
.095 
.031 
-.012 
.034 
INEDAC 
1 
-.296*** 
.112 
-.254** 
.101 
-.083 
.259*** 
1 
-0.172* 
0.062 
-0.171* 
0.029 
-0.108 
LnADISH 
1 
-.337*** 
.238** 
-.072 
-.019 
-.663*** 
1 
-.273*** 
-.039 
.165 
.047 
INED 
1 
-.173* 
.121 
-.023 
.206** 
1 
-.101 
.066 
-.041 
SqSCON 
1 
-.118 
-.134 
-.399*** 
1 
-.004 
-.111 
LnAGE 
1 
.216** 
.287*** 
ROA LnSA 
1 
.082 1 
1 
.201** 1 
*** Significance at the 1% level or better; ** Significance at the 5% level or better; * Significance at the 10% level or better 
Variables 
SAC - size of audit committee; MAC - frequency of audit committee meetings; INED_AC - audit committee independence; LnADISH - audit committee directors’ shareholding 
(logarithmic transformed); INED - board independence; SqSCON - share ownership concentration (square root transformed); LnAGE - listing age (logarithmic transformed); 
ROA - return on assets (a proxy for profitability); LnSA - sales (a proxy for firm size) (logarithmic transformed). 
All variables are as defined in Table 2 
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Table 5 Multiple Regression Results: IC Disclosure at both Overall and Component Levels 
(Constant) 
SAC 
MAC 
INED AC 
LnADISH 
FEXP AC 
INED 
SqSCON 
LnAGE 
ROA 
LnSA 
R 
R Square 
Adj. R Square 
S.E. 
F 
Sig. 
VIF 
1.480 
1.427 
1.195 
2.141 
1.361 
1.206 
1.374 
1.294 
1.102 
2.822 
Model 1 
ICDI 
0.186 
(4.872***) 
0.019 
(3.255***) 
0.009 
(2.103**) 
-0.015 
(-0.601) 
-0.006 
(-2.141**) 
-0.020 
(-1.218) 
0.084 
(1.888*) 
-0.007 
(-2.284**) 
-0.012 
(-2.247**) 
0.002 
(2.389**) 
0.012 
(3.49***) 
0.817 
0.668 
0.631 
0.050 
17.925 
0.000 
Model 2 
HICDI 
0.247 
(6.122***) 
0.016 
(2.588**) 
0.000 
(0.099) 
0.002 
(0.092) 
0.001 
(0.536) 
0.013 
(0.726) 
0.003 
(0.062) 
-0.003 
(-0.867) 
-0.012 
(-2.13**) 
0.000 
(0.153) 
0.015 
(4.143***) 
0.684 
0.468 
0.408 
0.053 
7.836 
0.000 
Model 3 
SICDI 
0.189 
(3.751***) 
0.015 
(2.008**) 
0.011 
(2.005**) 
-0.003 
(-0.083) 
-0.008 
(-2.425**) 
-0.037 
(-1.686*) 
0.122 
(2.077**) 
-0.009 
(-2.342**) 
-0.002 
(-0.294) 
0.002 
(1.716*) 
0.006 
(1.21) 
0.727 
0.529 
0.476 
0.066 
9.995 
0.000 
Model 4 
RICDI 
0.108 
(1.705*) 
0.028 
(2.907***) 
0.015 
(2.065**) 
-0.025 
(-0.597) 
-0.006 
(-1.449) 
-0.035 
(-1.287) 
0.124 
(1.679*) 
-0.007 
(-1.433) 
-0.020 
(-2.324**) 
0.004 
(2.339**) 
0.018 
(2.998***) 
0.759 
0.576 
0.528 
0.084 
12.078 
0.000 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; Significant at the 10% level or better 
Variables 
SAC - size of audit committee; MAC - frequency of audit committee meetings; INED_AC - audit committee independence; 
LnADISH - audit committee directors’ shareholding (logarithmic transformed); INED - board independence; SqSCON - share 
ownership concentration (square root transformed); LnAGE - listing age (logarithmic transformed); ROA - return on assets (a 
proxy for profitability); LnSA - sales (a proxy for firm size) (logarithmic transformed). 
All variables are as defined in Table 2 
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Table 6 Multiple Regression Results: Sensitivity Analysis of Audit Committee Independence 
(INED_AC_Dum), Chairman Sitting on Audit Committee (CHAC), and Board Size (BSZ) 
Model 5 Model 6 
ICDI 
Model 7 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; 
Model 8 
(Constant) 
SAC 
MAC 
INEDAC 
INED_AC_Dum 
LnADISH 
FEXPAC 
CHAC 
INED 
SqSCON 
BSZ 
LnAGE 
ROA 
LnSA 
R 
R Square 
Adj. R Square 
S.E. 
F 
Sig. 
0.180 
(5.401***) 
0.018 
(3.089***) 
0.009 
(2.128**) 
-
-
-0.012 
(-1.039) 
-0.006 
(-2.245**) 
-0.019 
(-1.159) 
-
-
0.082 
(1.855*) 
-0.007 
(-2.376**) 
-
-
-0.011 
(-2.212**) 
0.002 
(2.338**) 
0.013 
(3.603***) 
0.819 
0.671 
0.634 
0.050 
18.141 
0.000 
0.192 
(4.248***) 
0.019 
(3.248***) 
0.009 
(2.072**) 
-0.019 
(-0.649) 
-
-
-0.005 
(-2.027**) 
-0.020 
(-1.227) 
-0.004 
(-0.26) 
0.085 
(1.893*) 
-0.007 
(-2.282**) 
-
-
-0.012 
(-2.222**) 
0.002 
(2.354**) 
0.012 
(3.37***) 
0.818 
0.668 
0.627 
0.050 
16.131 
0.000 
0.197 
(5.011***) 
0.015 
(2.285**) 
0.008 
(1.962*) 
-0.017 
(-0.687) 
-
-
-0.006 
(-2.284**) 
-0.020 
(-1.203) 
-
-
0.094 
(2.088**) 
-0.007 
(-2.286**) 
0.018 
(1.143) 
-0.011 
(-2.185**) 
0.002 
(2.257**) 
0.010 
(2.723***) 
0.820 
0.673 
0.632 
0.050 
16.470 
0.000 
0.200 
(4.38***) 
0.015 
(2.274**) 
0.008 
(1.941*) 
-0.019 
(-0.672) 
-
-
-0.006 
(-2.181**) 
-0.020 
(-1.204) 
-0.002 
(-0.153) 
0.095 
(2.081**) 
-0.007 
(-2.278**) 
0.018 
(1.117) 
-0.011 
(-2.166**) 
0.002 
(2.232**) 
0.010 
(2.667***) 
0.820 
0.673 
0.628 
0.050 
14.932 
0.000 
Significant at the 10% level or better 
Variables 
SAC - size of audit committee; MAC - frequency of audit committee meetings; INED_AC - audit committee independence; 
LnADISH - audit committee directors’ shareholding (logarithmic transformed); INED - board independence; SqSCON - share 
ownership concentration (square root transformed); LnAGE - listing age (logarithmic transformed); ROA - return on assets (a 
proxy for profitability); LnSA - sales (a proxy for firm size) (logarithmic transformed). 
All variables are as defined in Table 2 
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Appendix A Research Instrument - IC Checklist 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Human capital 
Number of employees 
Employee age 
Employee diversity 
Employee equality 
Employee relationship 
Employee education 
Skills/know-how/expertise/knowledge 
Employee work related competences 
Employee work-related knowledge 
Employee attitudes/behavior 
Employee commitments 
Employee motivation 
Employee productivity 
Employee training 
Vocational qualifications 
Employee development 
Employee flexibility 
Entrepreneurial spirit 
Employee capabilities 
Employee teamwork 
Employee involvement with community 
Other employee features 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Relational capital 
Customers 
Market presence 
Customer relationships 
Customer acquisition 
Customer retention 
Customer training & education 
Customer involvement 
Company image/reputation 
Company awards 
Public relation 
Diffusion & networking 
Brands 
Distribution channels 
Relationship with suppliers 
Business collaboration 
Business agreements 
Favourite contract 
Research collaboration 
Marketing 
Relationship with stakeholders 
Market leadership 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Structural capital 
Intellectual property 
Process 
Management philosophy 
Corporate culture 
Organization flexibility 
Organization structure 
Organization learning 
Research & development 
Innovation 
Technology 
Financial dealings 
Customer support function 
Knowledge-based infrastructure 
Quality management & improvement 
Accreditations (certificate) 
overall infrastructure/capability 
Networking 
Distribution network 
Source: Li et al. (2008) 
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